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COMMENTS
CONTRACTS TO MAKE JOINT OR MUTUAL WILLS
I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding averments of nonexistence,' admonitions con-
cerning their use,2 and a surrounding climate of confusion,3 con-
tractual "joint and mutual" wills abound.4 Acknowledging this
often lamentable, but calculable, circumstance, it is the purpose of
this comment to explore the effect of the relationship of a contract
and a will with regard to contractual joint or mutual wills.5 Specifi-
cally investigated will be the moment the contract is created, bind-
ing the hands of the agreeing parties and precluding effective unilat-
eral deviation.6
An illustration of the scope of this inquiry is found in Estate
of Chayka,7 the most significant recent Wisconsin pronouncement
on the subject of "joint and mutual wills." In Chayka, the supreme
court was faced with property and money transfers, both inter vivos
and testamentary, by a widow to her second husband. The difficulty
with these transfers lay in their contravention of a prior agreement
made between the widow and her first husband, who, executing a
joint will, had formally contracted not to vary their mutually agree-
able dispositive scheme. The supreme court, while recognizing the
inherently ambulatory nature of a will, refused to allow the later
1. Sparks, A Draftsman's View of Joint and Mutual Wills, 4 INSTITUTE ON ESTATE
PLANNING 70.300, 70.301 (1970): "Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a joint will.
Lord Mansfield's dictum nearly two centuries ago that 'there cannot be a joint will' was
true then, and it is equally true at the present time." Cf. Earl of Darlington v. Pulteney, 98
Eng. Rep. 1075, 1079 (K.B. 1775).
2. Kroncke, Joint and Mutual Wills Revisited, 43 Wis. BAR BULL. 28, 32 (1970), quot-
ing William Herbert Page: "Never draft a joint will for your client."
3. Comment, Joint and Mutual Wills, 38 MARQ. L. REv. 30 (1955).
4. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON VILLS § 10.1 (4th ed. 1960).
5. For an appreciation of the breadth of this area see B. SPARKS, CONTRACrS TO MAKE
WILLS (1956).
6. Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 245, 301 S.W.2d 621,624 (1957): "[A]t the heart
of a mutual will lies a contract of the parties." But see WIs. STAT. § 853.13 (1969):
(2) This section applies to a joint will (except if one of the testators has died prior
to April 1, 1971) as well as to any other will; there is no presumption that the testators
of a joint will have contracted not to revoke it.
7. 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970). This passage has been favorably quoted very
recently in Estate of Schultz, 53 Wis. 2d 643, 646, -_ N.W.2d _ - (1972).
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transfers to stand. Absent a contractual provision to the contrary,
once the survivor of the will-contract arrangement received the
consideration contemplated in the contract, that survivor lost his
ability to modify the contract.
Thus upholding the sanctity of contract, the court pinpointed
the temporal moment from which there could be no return:
Such contract becomes partially executed upon the death of one
of the parties to the agreement and the acceptance by the survivor
of properties devised or bequeathed under the will and pursuant
to the [contract].8
Thusly stated, partial execution of the contract--consideration suf-
ficient to bind the parties to the agreement-includes two elements.
Not only must one of the parties to the agreement die, but the
survivor must also accept the property devised by the deceased
pursuant 'to the contract.
This proposition's forceful clarity is undermined for two rea-
sons. The first involves Chayka's reliance upon Kessler v. Olen9 as
authority for the dual requirement of "partial execution." Kessler
stood for the proposition that the critical moment after which uni-
lateral deviation from a contractual will could not occur, and spe-
cific performance of the contract would lie, was the moment the
first of the contracting parties died, leaving the mutually agreed-
upon will in force. Since this moment does not involve the survi-
vor's acceptance of the property conferred by the deceased's will,
it is a much different moment than that suggested in Estate of
Chayka.10
Also undermining the clarity of the Chayka proposition is its
apparent disregard of preceding Wisconsin case law which has,
from time to time, adopted other temporal moments in determining
when rights and obligations pursuant to contractual wills arise.1
Thus, for example, earlier cases have held contract rights and obli-
gations to exist during the lives of the parties, 12 or, as suggested
above in Kessler, from the death of the first of the contracting
parties. 3 If Chayka is considered the last word on the subject of
8. 47 Wis. 2d at 106, 176 N.W.2d at 563-64 (emphasis added).
9. 228 Wis. 662, 280 N.W. 352 (1938).
10. Id. at 669, 280 N.W. at 355-56.
11. See notes 57 and 100 and accompanying text infra.
12. See, e.g., Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N.W. 801 (1934).
13. See, e.g., Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966); Pederson v.
First Nat'l Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966).
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when contract rights and obligations pursuant to contractual joint
or mutual wills are created, validly questioned is whether these
prior cases have been overruled sub silentio?
The Chayka decision thereby serves to bring into focus the
parameters of this discussion. Precisely when is a contract con-
nected either with a joint will or mutual wills binding upon the
parties to that contract?
II. DEMYTHOLOGIZING
Nowhere in the law as in the law of "joint and mutual wills"
is an Archimedean departure point so acutely needed.1 4 Serving as
that point is a discussion of the various myths l5 which have tradi-
tionally plagued the area of contracts connected with joint or mu-
tual wills. The causes of the confusion are two. Primarily, there has
been a blurring of the lines between the separate and distinct con-
cepts of contracts and wills. As well, the terminology used has
suffered from a fundamental lack of clarity.
A. Contracts v. Wills
A large part of the confusion surrounding contracts to make
wills has resulted from a failure to recognize their dual nature. 6
Courts have often either denied the existence of the contract, 7 or
treated the will as a contract by refusing to recognize its inherently
ambulatory nature.18 The law has no concept of "will made in
pursuance of a contract."'" While contracts and wills are often used
conjointly, the will must be treated as a will and the contract as a
contract.2
0
The will, because of its gratis nature, is always revocable. 21 This
14. Archimedes (c. 287-212 B.C.), a Greek mathematician and inventor was reported
to have said: "Give me a place to stand and I [will] move the earth."
15. Sparks, supra note 1, at 70.300; see also B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE 'WILLS
122 (1956).
16. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); Estate of Engle, 129 Ore. 77,
276 P. 270 (1929); In re Swenk's Estate, 176 Pa. Super. 513, 108 A.2d 825 (1954). But see
Mosloski v. Gamble, 191 Minn. 170, 253 N.W. 378 (1934) (recognizing the distinction). See
also Drake, The Public Policy of Contracts to Will Future Acquired Property, 7 MICH. L.
Rav. 318, 320 (1909).
17. In re Fisher, 196 Wash.41, 81 P.2d 836 (1938).
18. Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E. 528 (1928); Elmer v. Elmer, 271 Mich.
517, 260 N.W. 759 (1935) (dicta); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 S.E. 749 (1918).
19. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 49, at 224 (2d ed. 1953).
20. Id.
21. There is one exception provided in the Wisconsin probate code. Where the testator
becomes incapacitated subsequent to the will's execution, vis. STAT. § 853.01 (1969) pre-
cludes his effective revocation.
1972]
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is true regardless of its execution pursuant to a contract. Given the
proper formalities, a later will is entitled to be probated.2 2 The
contract, on the other hand, is a conscious assumption of legal
relations separate from the will.2 When the formalities of contract
law are complied with, mutual consent is requisite to any
deviation.Y
Recognizing this fundamental dichotomy, certain results can be
seen to flow therefrom. First, the formalities of execution vary. 25
Second, consideration or its equivalent, while necessary in the con-
tract, is unnecessary in the will. 2 Third, the forum for litigation is
entirely different. Although varying from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, wills are usually handled in probate courts while contracts are
litigated in courts of law or equity. 27
B. Lack of Clarity
The "[h]istorical subservience of the contract problem to the
will problem"2 in the law of "joint and mutual wills" is mani-
fested throughout the reports in a studied impreciseness of language
usage. As the following examples indicate, needed is a more cau-
tious use of the tools of communication.
1. Joint v. Mutual
Often, courts have equated the terms "joint" and "mutual. ' 29
While frequently coincidental in their legal ramifications, they sim-
ply do not mean the same thing. A "joint" will has traditionally
been held to connote a single document serving as the separate wills
22. Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 P. 1065 (1924); In re Schefe's Estate, 261 Wis.
113, 52 N.W.2d 375 (1952).
23. Sparks, supra note 1, at 70.306.
24. Dufour v. Pereira, I Dick. 419, 421, 21 Eng. Rep. 332, 333 (1769): "It is a contract
between the parties, which cannot be rescinded, but by consent of both."
25. See, e.g., Note, Joint or Mutual Wills, 61 HARV. L. Rav. 675, 681 (1948).
26. 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 4, at § 10.6: "[W]ithout consideration a
promise to make a will cannot be enforced."
27. In re Rolls, 193 Cal. 594, 226 P. 608 (1924). An exception to this general rule
prevails in Wisconsin. According to Wis. STAT. § 859.33(2) (1969), any contested claim is
taken care of by the probate court. Presumably this would include a disputed contract claim
as well.
28. Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of
Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 358 (1930).
29. Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102, 274 N.W. 99 (1937); Estate of Chayka, 47
Wis. 2d 102, 105, 176 N.W.2d 561, 563 (1970): "We deal here with a joint, mutual and
reciprocal will .... " But see Estate of Randall v. McKibben, - Iowa _ _ 191
N.W.2d 693, 699 (1971) which notes the distinction between joint wills and joint wills which
are also mutual (reciprocal).
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of two persons.30 A "mutual" will has usually been held to be the
separate wills of two persons on separate documents. 3' One author
notes the emphasis placed upon the physical fact of one, rather than
two, documents.3 2 Another regards the determining factor one of
intent.3 Yet another suggests that there can be no such thing as a
"joint" will.u While this impreciseness presents no insurmountable
obstacle, as a joint will and mutual wills are usually treated alike
when executed pursuant to a contract,35 it should be noted that,
technically, there is no such legal entity as a "joint and mutual
will"-a term so often found in the reports and commentary." To
be such, a purported will would have to be (a) both one document
and two, or (b) intended by the parties to be both a single will and
a double will at the same time. Regardless of the definition one
chooses, a "joint and mutual will" is a semantical impossibility.
2. Rescission v. Revocation
Again illustrating the lack of clarity so prevalent in the law of
contractual wills is the interchangeable usage of the terms "revoca-
tion" and "rescission.137 Often found are statements to the effect
that "[a]t this point the contract becomes irrevocable" and that the
will has, by virtue of the contract, lost its capacity to be revoked. 31
Succinctly stated, the terms "revocation" and "rescission" are not
synonymous. Revocation refers to the unilateral act of withdrawing
some power, authority, or thing granted. 39 Rescission, on the other
hand, bears a more restricted connotation. At its heart lies a
30. American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 333 Ill. 261, 162 N.W. 80 (1928).
31. Mullen v. Johnson, 157 Ala. 262, 47 So. 584 (1908); Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa
1102,274 N.W. 99 (1937).
32. Comment, Joint and Mutual Wills, 38 MARQ. L. Rav. 30,31 (1955).
33. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 4, at § 11.1.
34. Sparks, supra note 1, at 70.300.
35. Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927 (1925).
36. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 4, § 11.1, at 553: "[I]t is improper to speak
of an instrument as being a 'joint and mutual' will, for it can only be one or the other and
not both." It should be noted, however, that a number of jurisdictions do give a separate
connotation to a "joint and mutual" will. Thus, for example, in Nye v. Bradford, 189
S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), affd, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946), the Texas
Court of Appeals defined a "joint and mutual" will as a single testamentary instrument
with reciprocal provisions. See also Comment, The Joint and Mutual Will, 16 BAYLOR L.
REV. 167 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Estate of Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 176 N.W.2d 561,563 (1970).
38. 1 J. SCHOULER, WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS § 452, at 566 (5th ed.
1915): "[W]e answer that such a will loses in effect its revocable character. ... See also
Goddard, Mutual Wills, 17 MICH. L. REv. 677 (1919).
39. Ford v. Greenwalt, 292 111 121, 126 N.E. 555 (1920).
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mutual agreement or undertaking, and "[i]t should be restricted to
the cancellation of contracts and grants involving mutual obliga-
tions."40
3. Contracts to Make Wills v. Contracts Not to Revoke Wills
Also often interchangeably used are the terms "contract to
make a will" and "contract not to revoke a will."'" A moment's
thought indicates the separate connotation of these terms. In order
to contract not to revoke a will, the will must already be in exist-
ence. Contracting to make a will, on the other hand, implies the
present nonexistence of a mutually agreeable will. This is not to
suggest that different principles apply to each, for they do not.4 2
However, the time at which each might become incapable of unilat-
eral deviation, as will be later discussed,43 may vary.
III. CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS: WHEN CREATED?
The key to understanding joint or mutual wills lies in recogniz-
ing the importance of the contract-the bilateral agreement to ei-
ther execute an agreed-upon will or refrain from revoking an exist-
ing will. The contract, as shall be discussed, involves a host of
substantive rights and obligations distinct from those rights and
obligations attendant upon the will. Happily, the functions and
effects of these separate legal entities are frequently coincidental in
this unique relationship. Often, however, the functions and effects
of the contract diverge from those of the will. It is at this point,
the point of divergence of the respective functions and effects of the
contract and the will, that confusion arises.
As important to the understanding and effective use of the con-
tractual will is the critical recognition of the differing points in time
various jurisdictions have chosen as the moment contract rights
and obligations are created. It is the fundamental tenet of this
analysis that the temporal moment recognized as the moment con-
tract rights and obligations pursuant to a contractual will arise and
become binding affects the wisdom of employing the contractual
will as an estate planner's tool. While this proposition is true in all
40. 1 H. BLACK, RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN IN-
STRUMENTS § 3, at 6 (2d ed. 1929). Accord, I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1236, at 389
(one vol. ed. 1952).
41. See, e.g., Downey v. Guifoile, 96 Conn. 383, 114 A. 73 (1921).
42. Patterson v. Bixby, 58 Wash. 454, 364 P.2d 10 (1961); accord, Robinson v. Wil-
liams, 231 Ark. 166, 328 S.W.2d 494 (1959).
43. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
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contractual wills, it is especially relevant in joint or mutual wills,
where the contract is often assumed or conclusively presumed, even
to the chagrin of the parties. For this reason, joint or mutual wills
executed pursuant to an agreement ably serve to illustrate the im-
pact of the contract upon the will-contract relationship.
The contract half of contractual joint or mutual wills has gener-
ally been held to create enforceable rights and obligations at three
distinct times: 4
1. During the lives of the agreeing parties, either at the exe-
cution of the wills pursuant to the contract or when the contract
is executed;45 or
2. At the death of one of the parties to the contract with his
mutually agreeable will in force;46 or
3. At the acceptance, by the survivor, of the benefits con-
ferred by the will pursuant to the contract. 47
A. During the Lives of the Parties
Not infrequently, jurisdictions have recognized contract rights
and obligations incident to a contractual will to exist during the
lives of the parties to the agreement. Stewart v. Todd, an elderly
mutual-will decision, presents a succinct statement of this position:
Inasmuch as their original contract rested on the mutual promise
of the contracting parties, carried out and recognized by the mak-
ing of reciprocal wills, it cannot be rescinded except by the con-
sent of both. As it takes the mutual consent of both to make a
contract, so it takes the mutual consent of both to rescind or
destroy the contract. 48
The premise upon which this and like decisions rest is that an
agreement between two persons relating to the nature of their dis-
positive scheme, as evidenced by the execution of mutually agreea-
ble wills,49 constitutes a valid offer and acceptance at that
44. But see Mitchell, Some aspects of Mutual Wills, 14 MODERN L. RaV. 136 (1951),
wherein the author argues for a fourth moment in England.
45. Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1919), modified on rehearing, 190
Iowa 296, 180 N.W. 146 (1920).
46. Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. 1042 (1917); Pederson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966).
47. Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 213, 2 P.2d 14, 16 (1931); Sherman v. Good-
son's Heirs, 219 S.W. 839, 841 (rex. Civ. App. 1920).
48. 190 Iowa 283, ____ 173 N.W. 619,622 (1919).
49. Conceptually it would appear that the contractual rights and obligations arise when
such agreement is executed. The cases, however, invariably add the necessity of the execution
of the will or wills, evidencing the agreement, as prerequisite to the creation of contract rights
and obligations. The answer probably lies in the recognition that, in nearly every case, the
wills are the only evidence of the agreement and there is no separately written document.
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moment.50 The consideration, as might be expected, is the promise
by each either to make a will or to forego revoking an existing
will.51 It is thus felt that the contractual provisions are binding upon
both parties duiing their lives unless mutually rescinded or
modified. 2
It must be acknowledged, perhaps explaining the relatively
small number of jurisdictions entertaining this position, that many
courts have difficulty finding a true breach of the contract to will
until the death of one of the parties. The reason lies in the fact that
a will is only effective from the date of the testator's death. A
contract to will is, therefore, only enforceable from that date as
well.es Largely disregarding this logical dilemma, cases positing the
existence of contractual rights and obligations during the lives of
the parties have emphasized a sufficient performance of the agree-
ment by one of the parties as constituting grounds for specifically
enforcing the balance of the agreement. Thus, for example, in
Stewart v. Todd, the execution of an agreed-upon will by a husband
coupled with his working his wife's farm for several years was held
to be a sufficient performance of the agreement to justify specific
performance during their lives.5' Care and maintenance of an aged
parent for several years has also been deemed a sufficient perform-
ance to warrant specific performance of the agreement. 5
50. Canada v. ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, _ 240 P. 927,931 (1925):
If the mutual agreement itself, followed by execution of the wills, is a consideration
sufficient to satisfy the law, it should be irrevocable without reference to any notice
that may be given by the party that wishes to revoke.
51. Ashbauth v. Davis, 71 Idaho 150, 227 P.2d 954 (1951); Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb.
591,134 N.W. 185 (1912).
52. 1 J. ScHoULER, supra note 38, § 458(a), at 577: "[I]n equity, at all events, a
subsequent revocation which was not mutual cannot destroy the trust or compact created
thereby."
53. Estate of Randall v. McKibben, - Iowa 191 N.W.2d 693, 698 (1971):
[A]s this court has repeatedly held, a will speaks from the date of testator's death,
the rights of any party thereunder accruing at that time .... This means, in event
the 1921 joint will . . . was also mutual [contractual], all rights thereunder vested
upon the death of William G. Randall.
But is there not a distinction between a contract to will and a contract to execute a will?
Whereas the contract to will cannot, technically, be performed or breached until the will is
effective (at death), the contract to execute a will must be breached or fulfilled before death.
This is primarily due to the difficulty of doing anything after one is dead. It should also be
recalled that there is a distinction between contracts to execute a will or to will and contracts
not to revoke a will. Obviously, a contract not to revoke, implying the present existence of
a will, can be breached during the lives of the parties. See Estate of Opal v. Commissioner,
450 F.2d 1085, 1086 (2d Cir. 1971).
54. Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1919).




Wisconsin, from time to time, has concurred, at least impliedly,
in recognizing a valid bilateral contract during the lives of the
parties, either at the moment the contract is executed or at the
moment the parties execute their wills, evidencing the agreement.
While some of these cases do not specifically involve joint or mu-
tual wills, they do involve contracts to make or refrain from revok-
ing wills. The principles being similar,5" they serve to illustrate a
willingness on the part of the Wisconsin court to find in existence
during the lives of the parties a bilateral contract to will.
In Estate of Jacobus,57 for example, a valid bilateral contract
was found in an accepted application for placement in a home for
the elderly. The application contained a provision whereby the ap-
plicant agreed to bequeath to the home any property she owned.
At that moment, the rights of the parties to the contract became
fixed and absolute. The court went on to say that the applicant's
subsequent discharge or withdrawal from the home would not vary
her contractual obligation. Although the applicant might be enti-
tled to a rebate, the trustees of the home retained the contractual
right to enforce the agreement.
Likewise, in Estate of Soles, 8 the court held that a bilateral
contract was formed when the decedent's letter offering a devise by
will in exchange for care and housekeeping services was accepted
by a letter promising to come from Ireland at once to begin her
duties. At this moment, according to the court, "[tihe agreement
having been made, the deceased could not abrogate or disregard it,
or terminate it without the consent of the claimant. ... ' -59
In yet another case, the Wisconsin court evidenced a tendency
to recognize a bilateral contract to make a will when the will is
made pursuant to the contract. In Estate of McLean,"0 it was held
that a promise to forbear from prosecuting a civil suit in exchange
for a promise by the decedent to devise in a particular manner gave
rise to a valid contract at the time the will was executed. The
execution of the will pursuant to the agreement created a trust in
the property promised, such trust arising when the agreed-upon will
was executed. 61
56. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 68, at 164 (1937).
57. 214 Wis. 143,252 N.W. 583 (1934).
58. 215 Wis. 129,253 N.W. 801 (1934).
59. Id. at 133,253 N.W. at 803.
60. 219 Wis. 222,262 N.W. 707 (1935).
61. Id. at 227, 262 N.W. at 710-11.
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These cases serve to indicate a willingness on the part of the
Wisconsin court to find a valid bilateral contract to devise during
the lives of the contracting parties. Often, this contract is deemed
to exist from the moment of execution of the wills; however, where
there has been found a written agreement, apart from the wills, the
moment of execution of that agreement has also sufficed.
While ultimately holding the reverse, two recent Wisconsin
cases strongly argue in favor of finding the existence of a bilateral
contract to make joint or mutual wills during the lives of the par-
ties. In Pederson v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 a case involving mutual
wills of a husband and wife, the contract was held "irrevocable"
after the death of the first party to the contract. However, the court,
in denying any necessity for a reaffirmation of the agreement,
pointed out that once a contract is entered into, it remains in effect
until it is either discharged or abandoned by mutual consent.
Cryptically, the court concluded: "Where wills are made in accord-
ance with such an agreement, the agreement will be specifically
enforced." Too, in Estate of Hoeppner,64 while pointing to the
death of one of the parties to the agreement as the moment at which
the rights of the parties become fixed, the court suggested that the
contract is created by the parties when they either execute wills
which are mutually agreeable or revoke existing wills for the same
purpose. 5 If the contract exists at the moment the joint will is
executed, withholding the right to sue upon it until the death of one
of the parties seems logically inconsistent. At the very least, these
cases are a bit ambiguous.
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Finding a Valid Contract
During the Lives of the Parties
There is at least one advantage in finding a valid bilateral con-
tract, incapable of unilateral deviation, during the lives of the
agreeing parties. Whether the critical moment is that at which the
contract is entered into6" or the moment the wills are made pursuant
to the contract,6 7 a degree of certitude can be had by the parties to
the agreement and their beneficiaries. That is, the contracting par-
62. 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966).
63. Id. at 655, 143 N.W.2d at 428 (emphasis added).
64. 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
65. Id. at 344, 145 N.W.2d at 758.
66. See. e.g., Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 133, 253 N.W. 801, 802 (1934).
67. Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927 (1925).
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ties have the assurance that their mutual consent is needed in order
to effect any changes in their dispositive scheme.
This, of course, is not to say the parties to the agreement are
foreclosed from revoking, in whole or in part, their contractual
wills. That they may do so is well established." However, the
above-mentioned certitude afforded the parties derives from the
execution, during their lives, of a valid agreement which may only
be rescinded mutually and from the fact that an action upon that
contract arises should the will be unilaterally varied or revoked.
This judicial recognition of a valid and binding contract existing
during the lives of the parties counters the obvious uncertainties as
to the solidarity of a testamentary contract in those jurisdictions
which uphold rescission of the contract upon mere notice to the
other party.69 Ultimately, the question may be asked as to what
contract theory allows rescission merely because one party notifies
another of his intent to do so.10
Despite the certitude afforded, judicial recognition of a bilateral
contract existing during the lives of the agreeing parties presents a
number of difficulties. Foremost, such a contract, binding upon the
parties except where mutually rescinded or modified, results in a
high degree of testamentary inflexibility. Two of the principal char-
acteristics of wills are that they are revocable and ambulatory dur-
ing the life of the testator.7 1 As noted above, a will's execution
pursuant to a contract does not affect these twin characteris-
tics-technically. However, the contract, once executed and in
force, is neither revocable nor ambulatory except insofar as both
parties agree to rescind or modify it.72 Thus, while it is able to be
maintained that joint or mutual wills executed pursuant to a con-
tract are yet revocable and ambulatory, judicial recognition of a
breach of contract action where the wills are not executed as pre-
scribed by the agreement makes such statements mere form without
substance. In effect, the wills lose their capacity to be altered at
whim.
This testamentary rigidity, resulting from judicial cognizance of
68. See, e.g., Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 606, 198 N.W. 763, 765 (1924): "It should
be borne in mind that it is the contract and not the will that is irrevocable."
69. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 111. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa
790, 89 N.V.2d 337 (1958); Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915).
70. Note, Joint or Mutual Wills, 61 HARV. L. REv. 675, 682 (1948); 50 MARQ. L. REv.
549,553 (1967).
71. T. ATKINSON, supra note 19, § 48, at 210.
72. Sparks, supra note I, at 70.302.
1972]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
a binding bilateral contract during the lives of the parties, is illus-
trated by cases applying the doctrine of anticipatory breach of
contract. 73 Courts have shown little reluctance in granting specific
performance,'7 money damages, 75 imposition of liens, 76 or recovery
in quantum meruit.77 As well, a constructive trust theory has often
been used to prevent wrongful deviation from a contractual will. 7
It ought be noted that most of the cases applying these remedies,
with perhaps an exception for those involving the remedy of specific
performance, were instituted after the death of one of the piarties.
When the action is commenced at this time, the problems involved
in computing a projected estate at one's death are usually
alleviated.
In the course of a lifetime, any of a myriad of different occur-
rences might tend to affect one's testamentary scheme. 79 Being the
result of a unilateral act, a will, standing alone, is flexible enough
to encompass these events. A contract-will combination of a bilat-
eral nature, however, cannot reflect life's vicissitudes except as both
parties concur. Thus, where parties execute wills pursuant to a
contract early in their lives, the contract might conceivably fore-
close an effective testamentary change. In one recent contractual
will situation, a man and his wife jointly executed a will in 1929.
In 1968, a total of 39 years later, the survivor died." Can it be
imagined that either of the parties to the contractual will never felt
the need for an alteration of the 1929 arrangement? To be effec-
tuated, as has been noted, the feeling had to be mutual.
The primary question incident to judicial recognition of a bind-
ing inter vivos contract of testamentary transfer involves the qual-
ity of title the parties unilaterally retain. That is, what may the
parties to a joint or mutual will executed pursuant to a contract do
73. T. ATKINSON, supra note 19, § 48, at 216.
74. Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941); Campbell v.
Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915); Heller v. Heller, 233 S.W. 380 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921).
75. Stone v. Burgeson, 215 Ala. 23, 109 So. 155 (1926); Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394,
285 S.W. 188 (1926).
76. Soho v. Wimbrough, 145 Md. 498, 125 A. 767 (1924).
77. Kessler v. Olen, 228 Wis. 662, 280 N.W. 352 (1938).
78. Whitney v. Hay, 181 U.S. 77 (1901); Lay v. Proctor, 147 Ore. 545, 34 P.2d 331
(1934).
79. Barr v. Ferris, 41 Cal. App. 2d 527, 107 P.2d 269 (1940) (divorce); Sybilla v.
Connally, 66 Ga. App. 678, 18 S.E.2d 783 (1942) (illegitimate child); Estate of Chayka, 47
Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970) (remarriage).
80. Estate of Thompson, 206 Kan. 288, 478 P.2d 174 (1971). See also Estate of Ho-
eppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 349, 145 N.W.2d 754, 760 (1966).
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with their individually owned property? It has been held in Tontz
v. Heath, a case representative of judicial opinion in this area, that
what was formerly a title in fee to such property converts, in effect,
to a mere life estate.81 While this case involved a deviation from the
contractual joint will by the survivor, it is submitted that the same
result obtains when a binding contract is recognized during the lives
of the parties. Thus, in order to "reconvert" title to the subject
matter of the contract back into a fee, both of the parties to the
agreement must concur in the conveyance or testamentary devia-
tion. What was formerly individually owned property has become,
by virtue of the agreement, mutually owned property. An at-
tempted conveyance or testamentary deviation unilaterally under-
taken may immediately result in a breach of contract action and
the entrance of a whole gamut of equitable considerations such as
good faith,8 2 necessity for maintenance,3 the reasonableness of
gifts,8 and the like.
In Wisconsin, the chief illustration of testamentary inflexibility
involves our third-party-beneficiary rule. It has been long estab-
lished, absent express reservation, that parties to a contract provid-
ing benefits to a third party may not alter those benefits without
the consent of the third party. 5 Judicial recognition of a contract
to make a joint or mutual will existing during the lives of the
parties, as can be seen, results in a compounded testamentary rigid-
ity. Not only must the parties, themselves, concur to the change,
but, absent express reservation of the right to modify, the third-
party beneficiaries of the will-contract arrangement must also con-
cur to any deviation or modification affecting their rights under the
original agreement.8 1
81. 20 Il. 2d 286, 170 N.E.2d 153 (1960). Seealso Chadwick v. Bristow, 146 Tex.481,
208 S.W.2d 888 (1948).
82. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. First Presbyterian Church, 134 Kan. 643,648-49, 7 P.2d 81,
84 (1932); Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289,95 S.W. 347 (1906).
83. Smith v. McHenry, 111 Kan. 659, 207 P. 1108 (1922); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214
N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915).
84. Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 176 S.W. 942 (1915); Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind.
App. 485,59 N.E.2d 568 (1945); Estate of Lenders, 247 Iowa 1205,78 N.W.2d 536 (1956).
85. Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517,526,93 N.W. 440,443 (1903):
[Tihe liability being once created by the acts of the immediate parties to the transac-
tion and the operation of the law thereon, neither one nor both of such parties can
thereafter change the situation as regards the third person without his consent.
86. Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966); Estate of Cochrane,
13 Wis. 2d 398, 108 N.W.2d 529 (1961).
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Peculiar to Wisconsin,87 in light of the rights of third-party
beneficiaries under a contract, the certitude incident to a contracted
joint or mutual will is heavily countered by an inordinately high
degree of testamentary inflexibility. Should the existence of a con-
tract be recognized during the mutual lives of the parties, it would
result in a virtual inability, even if both parties concurred, to alter
their will, at least insofar as the change affects the interests of third-
party beneficiaries.
B. At the Death of One of the Parties
Second in temporal sequence, though certainly not so in popu-
larity, 8 a contract in conjunction with a joint or mutual will has
been held to be binding and enforceable only at the death of one of
the parties to the agreement. The earliest statement of this
proposition is found in Dufour v. Pereira,9 wherein the English
Court laid to rest the doubt, in English law, as to the validity of
such arrangements. After one of the parties has died, stated the
Dufour court, leaving his mutually agreed-upon will in force, the
survivor shall not be allowed to rescind the contract. American
courts, without any clear departure from the early English cases
denying the validity of the contract to make joint or mutual wills,
gradually adopted the position of Dufour."0 Cogently stated:
If the contract is one to make a joint and mutual or reciprocal
will and the promise of each is consideration for the promise of
the other. . . . On the death of one party, leaving in effect a will
which contains the provisions prescribed by the contract, the
transaction is said to become an irrevocable contract as to the
survivor.9
The reasons traditionally offered for not recognizing the exist-
ence of a bilateral contract until the death of one of the parties to
the agreement are two. First, it has been felt that not until the
87. See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 782, at 76 (195 1) for a compilation of states with
Wisconsin-type third-party beneficiary rules.
88. A brief perusal of the reported cases will serve to indicate this as the most popular
choice by the courts.
89. 1 Dick. 419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (1769). See also Jones v. Martin, 3 Anstr. 882, 145
Eng. Rep. 1070 (1795). But cf. Comment, Joint, Mutual and Reciprocal Wills, 10
WASHBURN L.J. 450, 453 n.18, which posits Goilmere v. Battison, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682)
as the earliest English case so holding. Regrettably, this author does not have a sufficiently
ancient library or, for that matter, the inclination to settle this raging controversy.
90. A. REPPY & L. TOMPK1NS,THE HISTORY OF WILLS 25 (1928).
91. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 4, § 10.2, at 437 (emphasis added).
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moment of death can it be confidently stated that the parties will
fail to comply with the agreement by leaving in force a mutually
agreeable will.92 The situation is analogous where the agreement is
to refrain from revoking an existing will. In both instances a true
breach cannot be effected, absent contractual provisions to the
contrary, until death.13 The second reason often cited for adopting
this position is that it would be unfair to allow a survivor of a will-
contract arrangement to alter his will when the deceased can neither
consent to such alteration nor change his own will in response.9 4
These courts note that up until the moment of death either party
can change his will and thereby not be prejudiced by the other's
change. It is, thus, at this moment that the rights and obligations
of the parties become fixed.
These reasons represent the surface logic of the majority of
courts which opt for a contract judicially enforcable only at the
death of one of the parties to the contract-will arrangement. It is
submitted that underlying these reasons are considerations which
more adequately explain this position.
At least one author describes a contractual joint or mutual will
enforceable at the death of one of the parties as "a present contract
capable of future enforcement." 95 Analogous to contracts to sell
and convey at a future date, these testamentary agreements give the
parties a present equitable right to demand contractual compliance
at a given future date or upon the happening of a stated event.
These agreements, however, do not create present legal rights in the
subject matter of the agreement. Rather, created is an equitable
right on the part of the promisee's executor to demand compliance
at the death of the promisor. The promisee, as is evident, is the
party who dies with his mutually agreeable will in force. The promi-
sor, on the other hand, is the survivor of the parties who has prom-
ised his own compliance upon the compliance of the deceased. A
breach of contract action lies should the survivor of a valid agree-
ment to devise die without his mutually agreeable will in existence.96
Another explanation of the theory that a contractual joint or
92. Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. 1042 (1917); Estate of Thompson,
206 Kan. 288,478 P.2d 174 (1970).
93. Robinson v. Williams, 231 Ark. 166, 328 S.W.2d 494 (1959); Patterson v. Bixby,
58 Wash. 454, 364 P.2d 10 (1961).
94. Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966); Schwartz v. Schwartz,
273 Wis. 404, 78 N.W.2d 912 (1956).
95. B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 109 (1956).
96. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 4, at § 10.27.
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mutual will creates no judicially enforceable rights or obligations
until the death of one of the parties posits these arrangements as
mere unilateral offers to make a contract, rather than a contract
itself.9 That is, until one of the parties dies with his mutually
agreeable will in effect, the parties have only unilaterally offered to
contract. This looks to be the familiar contractual theory of accept-
ance consisting of the rendition of an act in exchange for an of-
feror's promise. Thus, only when the offer is accepted by one
party's dying with his mutually agreeable will in effect are the
rights and obligations fixed. As one writer explained this proposi-
tion:
What on the surface appears to be a qualified acceptance...
may in reality be merely an advance announcement of an unquali-
fied acceptance which is to take effect at some future date or on
the happening of some future event.9"
This theory of unilateral offers serves to best explain cases holding
a "contract" able to be unilaterally rescinded merely upon notice
by one party to another.99 Revoked by such notice is merely a
unilateral offer and not a bilateral contract.
1. Wisconsin Approach
In several cases, the Wisconsin court has favorably viewed a
testamentary contract as existing and binding only at the death of
one of the parties to the agreement. Illustrative, though not involv-
ing a joint or mutual will, is Kessler v. Olen.' In Kessler, a father
orally promised to will his property to his daughter in exchange for
her services of caring for him. At the commencement of the daugh-
ter's services, the father executed the agreed-upon will. After some
months, the father expelled his daughter from his home and revised
his will. While noting that quantum meruit was the preferable
theory of recovery, the court suggested that one party's dying and
leaving the mutually agreeable will in effect at his death constituted
sufficient performance to justify enforcement of an agreement,
written or oral. 10'
This position has been restated in three recent cases. In
97. B. SPARKS, supra note 95, at 116; Lally v. Cronen, 247 N.Y. 58, 159 N.E. 728
(1928).
98. G. GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 50, at 76 (1947).
99. See, e.g., Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 89 N.W.2d 377 (1958).
100. 228 Wis. 662, 280 N.W. 352 (1938).
101. Id. at 669, 280 N.W. at 355-56.
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Pederson v. First National Bank,102 the mutual wills of a husband
and wife were executed along with an agreement not to alter them.
Although the agreement was lost, the supreme court, in reversing
the trial court, felt that the agreement was sufficiently proven. The
plain intent of the parties, according to the court, was that only by
mutual consent could the mutual wills be varied. As to when this
contractual, mutual will was enforceable, the court stated:
[T]hough it is clear that the will of the survivor may be subse-
quently revoked or changed, the contract, after the death of the
first party to the contract, is irrevocable and will be enforced in
equity.13
In its discussion of the joint will of Emil and Elsie Hoeppner, the
court, in Estate of Hoeppner,104 elaborated upon the benefit-of-the-
bargain theory-a consideration concept long familiar to the law
of contracts. At the moment of Elsie's death with the agreed-upon
will in existence, concluded the supreme court, the rights and obli-
gations of the parties solidified.1 5 At this moment, the survivor,
Emil, received what he had bargained for-the will "of Elsie in
conformance with their agreement. As a result, at her death, alter-
native dispositions by Emil were foreclosed. Lastly, in Sipple v.
Zimmerman," 6 the contractual, mutual wills of William and Lena
Kraft were held incapable of effective unilateral deviation at the
death of William with his agreeable will in effect. At this moment,
said the court, Lena Kraft received what she had bargained for, a
good and sufficient consideration. 07 These cases serve to indicate
the favorable position taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court with
respect to recognizing contractual joint or mutual wills binding at
the death of the first of the contracting parties.'
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Finding a Valid Contract at
the Death of One of the Parties
Judicial recognition of the creation of a contract at the death
of one of the parties with his agreed-upon will in force offers a
102. 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966).
103. Id. at 656, 143 N.W.2d at 428 (emphasis added).
104. 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
105. Id. at 346, 145 N.W.2d at 757-58.
106. 39 Wis. 2d 481, 159 N.W.2d 706 (1968).
107. See also Olson v. Reisimer, 170 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Wis. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 271 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1959).
108. Quaere: Has Estate of Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970) overruled
this line of cases sub silentio? See note 161 and accompanying text infra.
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number of advantages. Among those fully cognizant of the implica-
tions of a contractual will,' the creation of contractual rights and
obligations at the death of one of the parties is probably most in
accord with their intent."' This was recently noted in the Hoeppner
decision. 1' Interpreting the contractual joint will of a man and
wife, the court felt that what was contemplated by the parties in
the agreement was the other's leaving, at death, the agreeable will
in effect. This was what they had bargained for, and, hence, at this
moment, the rights and obligations crystalized under the judicially
enforceable contract. This interpretation is in accord with the pre-
ponderance of decisions which have discussed the intent of the
parties .112
As well, a fair reading of the suggested contractual will form
presents a strong inference of the creation of contractual rights and
obligations only at the death of one of the parties to the agree-
ment.13 It is this type of a will which is read and signed by the
testators-a will which implies that at the moment of the death of
the first with the contractual will operative, the other is bound to
comply. Mentioned not, even inferentially, are contract rights aris-
ing during the lives of the parties," 4 or only after the other chooses
to accept benefits conferred by the will."5 Judicial recognition of
the moment of death as the moment contractual rights and obliga-
tions arise would thus conform to the probable expectation of the
parties.
Also an advantage incident to judicial recognition of a bilateral
109. See Editorial Comment, 169 A.L.R. 9, 94-95 (1947) for a discussion of how few
laymen realize fully the implications and effect of a contract connected with a joint or mutual
will.
110. Wilson v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S.E. 539 (1935).
11l. Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis, 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966); accord, Sipple v.
Zimmerman, 39 Wis. 2d 481, 159 N.W.2d 706 (1968).
112. National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson, 141 Kan. 903, _ 44 P.2d 269, 270
(1935):
By the joint will, Martin Childers impliedly agreed that whatever property he may
die seized of shall pass under that will to the seven children named . . . . He did not
bind himself not to alienate or dispose of any of his property during his life as his
own wants, needs, or convenience might require . . . . [H]e did not thereby intend
to disable himself to exercise dominion over his own property.
113. 1 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.540, at 161 (6th ed.
1959):
The said A.B. hereby gives, devises and bequeaths unto the said C.D. all property of
every kind or nature, real, personal or mixed of which he, the said A.B., may die
seized orpossessed, if the said C.D. survives him. . . . (Emphasis added.)
114. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
115. See note 150 and accompanying text infra.
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contract's existence only at the death of one of the parties is an
enhanced testamentary flexibility. As has been noted, as a result of
Wisconsin's peculiar third-party beneficiary rule, a contractual will
could involve a high degree of testamentary inflexibility.116 Once the
existence of a contract is acknowledged, not only must the parties
themselves concur to a deviation, third parties whose interests
under the original contract are affected must also concur.11 7 Thus,
if the existence of a binding contract is recognized during the lives
of the parties, balking third parties might conceivably hinder any
change. This was noted recently in Estate of Hoeppner,118 wherein
the Wisconsin third-party beneficiary rule was extensively dis-
cussed. The court concluded that since a contract to make a will
in some agreeable manner is only effective upon the death of one
of the parties with that will in force, thereby binding the other to
the agreed-upon disposition, no rights are conferred upon third
parties until that moment either."1 This judicial recognition of con-
tracts to make joint or mutual wills, held to be effective at the death
of the first, rather than during the lives of the parties, offers an
enhanced testamentary flexibility.
The chief disadvantage indigenous to judicial recognition of
contractual rights and obligations at the death of one of the parties
involves the confusion surrounding after-acquired property. 20 The
question is whether the contract, effective as of the death of the first
to die, applies to property conceivably acquired by the survivor
many years later. Logically, the solution depends upon the intent
of the parties. Where that intent is not readily apparent, however,
the interpretations have been quite inconsistent. Illustrative of this
confusion are two conflicting cases in the same jurisdiction. In
Murphy v. Slaton,2 1 the Texas court interpreted an ambiguous
116. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
117. Estate of Cochrane, 13 Wis. 2d 398, 108 N.W.2d 529 (1961); Tweeddale v.
Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903).
118. 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
119. Id. at 347, 145 N.W.2d at 759:
It is obvious that no rights vest in" the claimants upon the making of that agreement.
The rights of the claimants arise from the will of 1949 and only become fixed and
irrevocable (the [contract] rights, not the will) upon the death of Elsie Hoeppner. It
is this last mutually agreeable will that binds the hand of Emil Hoeppner and deter-
mines the disposition of the estate of Emil Hoeppner in a court of equity.
120. See Comment, The Contractual Will: Invitation to Litigation and Excess Taxation,
48 TEXAS L. REv. 909,914 (1970).
121. 154 Tex. 35, 273 S.W.2d 588 (1954). The will provided in part:
It is our will and desire that the survivor of us . . . shall . . . have all the estate of
every description, real, personal, or mixed, which either or both of us may own at
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contractual will provision as applying only to that property owned
by the parties at the death of the first. In order to include property
acquired after the contractual rights arose, the court suggested that
the parties would have to expressly so provide. In Weidner v.
Crowther,122 on the other hand, involving testamentary language as
ambiguous as the Murphy will, it was held that property acquired
by the survivor after the death of the first to die was within the
purview of the contract.
The Wisconsin court has also vacillated in its determinations
regarding after-acquired property. In Allen v. Ross, 1 for example,
the court, in interpreting a contractual mutual will, indicated, at
least impliedly, that after-acquired property might be included
within the contract:
If it be necessary in order to give effect to such agreement, equity
will impress the property of the survivor with a trust in favor of
the person who is entitled to the property under such mutual
agreement. 12
In Estate of Schefe,125 on the other hand, a contractual joint will
was interpreted as applying only to property owned by the parties
jointly. Since property acquired after the death of the first decedent
could no longer be jointly owned, the contractual will provisions
did not apply to property acquired by the survivor. The dissent,
however, after extensive analysis, concluded that after-acquired
our death, to be used, enjoyed, occupied and conveyed by such survivor for and during
his or her life time, as the case may be, and that upon the death of such survivor any
of such estate then remaining shall be divided among the persons following ....
Id. at _ 273 S.W.2d at 590.
122. 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957). The will provided in part:
Second: We mutually will, direct and devise, that after the death of either of us,
all our property and estate, real, personal or mixed, and wether [sic] deemed com-
mon or separate estate, shall be inherited by and shall at once pass into the unre-
stricted possession of the last survivor of either of us in fee simple.
Third: We hereby further will and direct that after the death of the last survivor
of us all our property and estate, real, personal or mixed, common or separate, shall
be inherited and divided equally, share and share alike. ...
Id. at - 301 S.W.2d at 673.
123. 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929).
124. Id. at 164,225 N.W. at 832 (emphasis added).
125. 261 Wis. 113, 52 N.W.2d 375 (1952). The Schefe will provided in part:
Whereas. . . the parties also hold and have agreed to hold as joint owners all other
property which they now own or may hereafter acquire while both parties are living,
so that upon the death of one their entire estate becomes the sole and exclusive
property of the survivor. . ..
Id. at 115, 52 N.W.2d at 376.
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personalty was included under the contractual will. The basis for
the distinction, according to the dissent, was that while the legisla-
ture had changed the common law relating to after-acquired real
property,12 1 it had not done so with regard to after-acquired person-
alty. As such, the common law yet applies to personalty and oper-
ates to pass that personalty under the residuary clause, unless a
contrary intent clearly appears.
While Schefe may have represented somewhat of a definitive
statement concerning after-acquired property, it has been virtually
ignored in recent cases, 127 which have inarticulately placed reliance
upon "equitable considerations" in order to achieve a just result.
Thus, for example, in Estate of Chayka,12s the court held invalid
as violative of the agreement certain inter vivos gifts "of a substan-
tial portion of the property received under the joint will." Men-
tioned not was a situation where the only property transferred in
violation of the agreement is property acquired after the death of
the first decedent. Clearly, what to do with after-acquired property
has not been consistently determined in Wisconsin.
Along with the difficulties concerning after-acquired property,
recognition of rights and obligations at the death of one of the
parties to a contractual joint or mutual will may pose marital tax
deduction difficulties. Questionable is whether the surviving spouse
to a contractual joint or mutual will has received a sufficiently
absolute interest to qualify for the marital deduction. 129 Until re-
cently, all of the reported cases allowed the marital deduction de-
spite the restrictiveness of the survivor's interest.130 It was left to the
commentators to discuss this aspect of contractual joint or mutual
wills.1 3 1 As of this date, however, at least three cases have disal-
lowed the marital tax deduction on the basis of the survivor's insuf-
126. Wis. STAT. § 238.03 (1969):
Any estate, right or interest in lands acquired by the testator after the making of his
will shall pass thereby in like manner as if possessed at the time of making the will if
such shall manifestly appear by the will to have been the intention of the testator.
127. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 273 Wis. 404, 78 N.W.2d 912 (1956).
128. 47 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 176 N.W.2d 561,563 (1970).
129. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(1)(5).
130. United States v. Spicer, 332 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1964); Estate of Awtry v. Commis-
sioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955); McLean v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.
Mich. 1963); Schildmeier v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Ind. 1959).
131. See, e.g., Sparks, Application of the Marital Deduction to Joint and Mutual Wills,
37 Miss. L.J. 226, 242 (1966); Comment, Joint and Mutual Wills and the Marital
Deduction, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 209 (1960).
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ficient interest.132 These cases aside, it is worth noting that there is
an apparent conflict of purpose in attempting to qualify for the
marital tax deduction and, yet, making use of a testamentary con-
tract. The marital tax deduction, on the one hand, contemplates a
degree of freedom on the part of the survivor. 'The-purpose under-
lying the contractual will, on the other, is to assure a certain dispo-
sitive scheme.u The use of both is conceivably irreconcilable.
C. At the Survivor's Acceptance of the Benefits Conferred Under
the Contractual Will
A contract incident to a joint or mutual will has been widely
held incapable of unilateral variation only after the survivor to that
agreement has accepted the benefits conferred under the other's
will.'3 It is generally felt by courts adopting this position that when
one party to a contractual will has performed, whether such per-
formance be termed partial or full, 138 by dying with the mutually
agreeable will operative, the survivor who has accepted the benefits
conferred under the will should not be permitted to modify the
agreement.137 This, of course, is not to say that the survivor is
foreclosed from revoking his will in whole or in part. The will, as
has been noted, is always revocable regardless of contractual obli-
gations. 3 1 The contract, however, once formulated, is incapable of
unilateral variation and creates judicially enforcable rights and ob-
ligations. This position has been ably stated:
If two testators who have united in the execution of a mutual will
have devised their property to each other so that the devises form
a mutual consideration, neither, after the death of the other and
the probate of the will as to his property, is at liberty, after
accepting the benefit conferred, to repudiate the contract to the
132. Estate of Edward N. Opal, 54 T.C. 154 (1970), aff d, Estate of Opal v. Commis-
sioner, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate of Saul Krampf, 56 T.C. 293 (1971); Estate of
James Mead Vermilya, 41 T.C. 226 (1963).
133. Estate of Awtry v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955).
134. B. SPARKS, supra note 95, at 187-200.
135. See, e.g., Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 1217, 282 N.W. 316, 323 (1939); Camp-
bell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915); Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore.
208, 2 P.2d 14 (1931); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S.W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
136. This distinction is noted in Kessler v. Olen, 228 Wis. 662, 669-70, 280 N.W. 352,
355-56 (1938).
137. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 4, at § 10.2.
138. Keasey v. Engels, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932); Mosloski v. Gamble, 191
Minn. 170, 253 N.W. 378 (1934).
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injury of the heirs, or next of kin of the testator who predeceased
him. 39
Submerged in cases articulating theories of fraud, 4 ' estoppel, 4
part performance, 2 equitable considerations, 3 and the like as jus-
tification for holding contractual rights and obligations to arise
only at the acceptance of benefits, there exist two closely related,
but distinct, explanations of this proposition. For convenience, the
first may be termed an "election-to-accept" theory. Not to be
confused with traditional concepts of election against a spouse's
will, this "election-to-accept" theory has at its heart fundamental -
contract principles of offer and acceptance. 4 Courts opting for the
moment of acceptance of the benefits as the moment contractual
rights arise do not feel a valid contract exists merely because one
of the parties has died with an agreeable joint or mutual will in
effect.4 5 Such an act by a decedent only constitutes an ojffr of
contract. Needed yet is an unequivocal acceptance of that offer by
the survivor. The survivor who "elects" to take the benefits con-
ferred under the decedent's joint or mutual will thereby elects to
accept the decedent's offer of contract.' At this moment, the con-
tract being, thus, in existence, unilateral modification by the survi-
vor is foreclosed. Synonymous in these decisions, at least inferen-
tially, are "acceptance of the benefits" and acceptance of the dece-
dent's offer of contract." 7
Illustrative is Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs,4' an often-cited
Texas decision. The court, interpreting the contractual joint will of
two sisters, went so far as to suggest that the mutual compact could
have been avoided by the survivor had she not accepted the benefits
conferred under her deceased sister's will. Pinpointing the moment
139. 1 H. UNDERHILL, THE LAW OF \VILLS § 13, at 20 (1900).
140. Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 2 P.2d 14 (1931).
141. McGinn v. Gilroy, 178 Ore. 24, 165 P.2d 73 (1946); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs,
219 S.W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914).
142. McDowell v. Ritter, 153 Fla. 50, 13 So. 2d 612 (1943); Burke's Estate, 66 Ore.
252, 134 P. 11 (1913).
143. Ankeny v. Lieuallen, 169 Ore. 206, 113 P.2d 1113 (1941), affd on rehearing, 169
Ore. 222, 127 P.2d 735 (1942).
144. A case which apparently combines these "elections" is Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex.
618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946).
145. DeJong v. Huyser, 233 Iowa 1315, 11 N.W.2d 566 (1943); Tooker v. Vreeland, 92
N.J. Eq. 340, 112 Atl. 665 (Ch. 1921).
146. Chadwick v. Bristow, 204 S.W.2d 65 (rex. Civ. App. 1947).
147. See, e.g., Buckner's Estate, 186 Kan. 176, 348 P.2d 818 (1960); Dufner v. Haynen,
263 S.W.2d 662 (rex. Civ. App. 1953); Auger v. Shideler, 23 Wash. 2d 505, 161 P.2d 200
(1945).
148. 219 S.W. 839 (rex. Civ. App. 1920).
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the rights and obligations arise, the court stated: "[U]pon principle
and authority we think it became irrevocable after the survivor
ratified the will by having it probated, and then accepted and en-
joyed the benefits derived from its provisions." '149 Reasonable inter-
pretation of "ratification" suggests the court's meaning as an ac-
ceptance of the deceased's offer of contract. It is, thus, arguable
that the acceptance-of-the-benefits theory is partially explainable in
terms of contract rights and obligations not arising until the survi-
vor of a contractual joint or mutual will unequivocally accepts the
'decedent's offer of contract.15
A second explanation of the proposition that contractual rights
and obligations arise only when the survivor accepts the benefits
conferred under the decedent's will involves the traditional prob-
lems of proof of the agreement, peculiar to a joint or mutual will.
Contracts incident to a joint or mutual will have often been only
obliquely apparent. '5 As a result, courts have been forced to exer-
cise their gymnastic abilities in order to find the contract. One
technique has been that of recognizing the performance of the
agreement as sufficient evidence of its existence. As noted earlier, 52
a number of jurisdictions recognize the death of one of the parties
with his agreeable will in effect as a sufficient performance to evid-
ence the contract. In other jurisdictions, however, this is not a
sufficient performance to support an oral or obliquely written
agreement. Thus, for example, in a case representative of this posi-
tion, Carmichael v. Carmichael,13 the act of a father in leaving the
agreeable will in effect at this death and that of the mother in
accepting the benefits conferred thereunder were deemed sufficient
to remove the arrangement from the baleful purview of the statute
of frauds. This added evidentiary requirement of acceptance of the
benefits can be summed up to the effect that
[s]uch an agreement is valid if performed by the making of such
wills and the acceptance by the surviving party of the fruits of the
agreement, but it is valid only as a contract, the performance of
149. Id. at 841.
150. See, e.g., Tooker v. Vreeland, 92 N.J. Eq. 340,_. 112 A. 665,668 (Ch. 1921):
IT]hey, in consideration of reciprocal bequests to themselves and those of their choice,
bound themselves to abide the provisions of the mutual wills, and Mrs. Tooker,
having accepted the benefit of her husband's gift, became legally, and in conscience,
bound to carry out the obligations she undertook. (Emphasis added.)
151. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Bristow, 204 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
152. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
153. 72 Mich. 76, ......._ ,40 N.W. 173, 176-77 (1888).
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which by one party and the acceptance by the other has taken it
out of the statute of frauds.'5
It is submitted that these essentially contract considerations more
adequately explain why many jurisdictions opt for recognition of
contract rights and obligations only at the survivor's acceptance of
benefits conferred under the decedent's joint or mutual will. It
cannot be overemphasized that contract law has prevailed with
regard to contractual wills.
1. Wisconsin Approach
Wisconsin very early positioned itself with regard to contrac-
tual joint or mutual wills. In Allen v. Boomer,155 the surviving
husband of a contractual mutual will was held to have bound him-
self to the provisions of the instrument upon his election to accept
the benefits conferred by his wife's will. Although the court did not
clearly distinguish the will from the contract, it enforced the latter
by allowing the husband to receive only a life estate, giving the
remainder over to persons designated in the wife's will.
This recognition of the acceptance, by the survivor, of the bene-
fits conferred under a contractual will as the moment enforceable
rights and obligations arise has been reiterated often in Wisconsin
cases. In the classic Doyle v. Fischer15 decision, an oral contract
in conjunction with a joint will was held sufficiently proven under
the contract part-performance doctrine when the wife accepted the
benefits conferred under her husband's will. Granting specific per-
formance, the court found unilateral modification impossible
where mutual and reciprocal wills are made in accordance with
[the] agreement, and where, after the death of one of the agreeing
parties, the other takes under the will and accepts the benefits of
said agreement.15 7
This doctrine has been apparently reaffirmed in Schwartz v.
Schwartz,15 a significant decision, if only because it serves as au-
thority for totally inconsistent propositions. Early in the opinion,
the court suggested that relief could be had in equity where the
154. In re Burke's Estate, 66 Ore. 252, _, 134 P. 11, 13 (1913); See also Schramm
v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, _, 2 P.2d 14, 17 (1931).
155. 82 Wis. 364, 52 N.W. 426 (1892).
156. 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924); accord, Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162,225 N.W.
831 (1929).
157. 183 Wis. at 605, 198 N.W. at 765.
158. 273 Wis. 404, 78 N.W.2d 912 (1956).
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survivor of two testators to a joint will or two mutually recriprocal
wills "directly benefited" from the will of the first, but did not
fulfill his part of the bargain. 159 Later, however, in its concluding
remarks, the court stressed the important factor, upon which these
cases hinge, as being that of the inability of the deceased party to
consent to any change by the survivor. Absent mutual consent,
stated the court, Kreszensia Schwartz could not "revoke or mod-
ify" the agreement she made with her husband. 6 ' The inconsis-
tency becomes more readily apparent when it is recalled that mu-
tual consent can only occur during the lives of the agreeing parties.
This moment is far different and much earlier than the moment the
survivor accepts the benefits conferred pursuant to the contractual
joint or mutual wills.
This inconsistency was quickly noticed and commented upon in
two recent cases, Estate of Hoeppner6' and Sipple v.
Zimmerman.6 2 By redefining the concept of "benefit" so as to
include the act of one party to a contractual will dying with his
agreed-upon will in effect, the court found itself able to affirm both
propositions. Thus, while the Doyle-Schwartz "acceptance-of-the-
benefits" rationale is yet good law, according to Hoeppner, the
time of acceptance is not the exclusive moment at which rights and
obligations incident to contractual wills blossom in Wisconsin.
Included also as a moment at which contract rights and obligations
may arise in Wisconsin is the moment one of the parties dies with
the agreed-upon will operative. This act on the part of the deceased
in leaving such will in effect confers a sufficient "benefit" upon the
survivor so as to qualify under the "acceptance-of-the-benefits"
theory.
The rationale underlying this apparently inconsistent affirma-
tion found in Hoeppner and Sipple involves the logic underlying the
"acceptance-of-the-benefits" theory itself. It has been suggested
that courts have recognized contractual rights and obligations as
arising only upon the survivor's acceptance of benefits conferred
under the decedent's will because of the problem of proving oral
or vaguely written contracts to make wills." 3 The performance by
the survivor, however, in probating the will and accepting benefits
159. Id. at 409, 78 N.W.2d at 915.
160. Id. at412,78 N.W.2d at 916-17.
161. 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
162. 39 Wis. 2d 481, 159 N.W.2d 706 (1968).
163. See note 151 and accompanying text supra.
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thereunder has been felt sufficient to evidence the existence of an
agreement.
Jurisdictions adopting the "acceptance-of-the-benefits" theory
have usually applied it to all contractual wills rather than to certain
types. 164 Wisconsin, however, apparently has different rules for dif-
ferent situations. The strict "acceptance-of-the-benefits" theory
applies to cases wherein the agreement rests in parol or is obliquely
written. In other situations-for example, where the agreement is
readily apparent and without the statute of frauds-the moment of
the first party's death with the agreed-upon will in effect is the
moment contract rights arise. This is suggested by language in
Hoeppner:
[T]he language of Schwartz relied upon by the trial court
[acceptance of actual benefits] is more appropriate where there
is an oral agreement to will real estate contrary to the statute of
frauds . . 6"
The anomalous situation thus created in this line of cases is that
in Wisconsin there are two distinct, and perhaps conflicting rules
governing contractual wills. Where the contract only inferentially
exists, the "acceptance-of-actual-benefits" rule applies. However,
where the agreement is obvious, there is no necessity for demanding
an acceptance of actual benefits by the survivor. Rather, it is suffi-
cient for one of the parties to the agreement to die with his agreed-
upon will in effect to bind the hand of the other. As has been
pointed out, these are separate and distinct moments.
The most significant recent Wisconsin case concerning a con-
tractual "joint, mutual, and recriprocal will" '166 is Estate of
Chayka. 67 Though not involving a readily apparent contract, the
Chayka decision makes no distinction, as suggested in Hoeppner,11
between contracts expressed in separate documents, those referred
to in the joint will, or those which must be conclusively presumed.
The important factor, according to Chayka, in each of the above
types of contractual wills is the probate of the deceased's will by
the survivor. The contract becomes incapable of unilateral modifi-
164. Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N.W. 316 (1939); Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo.
289, 95 S.W. 347 (1906); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S.W. 839 (rex. Civ. App. 1920).
. 165. 32 Wis. 2d 339, 346, 145 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1966); See also Estate of Rogers, 30
Wis. 2d 284, 140 N.W.2d 273 (1966).
166. Is this not a semantical impossibility? See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
167. 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).
168. Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
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cation "upon the death of one of the parties to the agreement and
the acceptance by the survivor of properties devised or bequeathed
under the will." 169
Immediately, a host of questions arise. Has Chayka overruled
sub silentio the distinction between oral and written contracts to
will, which was established in both Hoeppner170 and Sipple?171 Does
the Doyle-Schwartz rationale (acceptance of actual benefits) again
prevail with respect to all contractual wills? Is the "benefit" re-
ferred to in Chayka the strict actual benefit or does it include the
"benefit" suggested in Hoeppner-that of the other's death with
his agreed-upon will in effect? Given this framework of obscurity,
a glimmer of clarity emerges. It is clear that Wisconsin has yet to
decide precisely at what moment a contract incident to a joint or
mutual will is created.
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Finding a Valid Contract
Upon Acceptance of Benefits
One of the advantages of judicial recognition of binding rights
and obligations incident to contractual wills as being created only
at the moment a survivor probates the will of the deceased and
accepts the benefits thereunder is that it results in an enhanced
flexibility on the part of the survivor with regard to the subject
matter of the agreement. It has been suggested that judicial recog-
nition of enforceable rights and obligations existing either during
the lives of the parties 172 or at the death of the first with the agreed-
upon will operative 173 results in a high degree of testamentary in-
flexibility. Indeed, it has often been held that such an arrangement
results in the transfer of a mere life estate to the survivor. 17 4 This
rigidity can be mitigated significantly by judicial recognition of the
creation of binding rights and obligations at the moment the survi-
vor elects to probate the decedent's will and take the benefits
thereunder.
In a typical contractual joint or mutual will situation, the hus-
band and wife either agree not to revoke existing wills or agree to
169. 47 Wis. 2d at 106, 176 N.W.2d at 563.
170. 32 Wis. 2d at 346-47, 145 N.W.2d at 758.
171. Sipple v. Zimmerman, 39 Wis. 2d 481,492-94, 159 N.W.2d 706,710-11 (1968).
172. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
173. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
174. Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 378, 24 N.W.2d 704, 709 (1946): "Subject
to the life estate ... the property ... may be impressed with a trust ... for the protection
and preservation of a remainder interest in fee ...."
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execute wills along a specific dispositive scheme. Absent any appar-
ent intent to the contrary, and assuming the judicial climate such
that the creation of rights and obligations pursuant to the contract
are recognized upon the acceptance of the benefits, the survivor is
afforded the opportunity to deal with the property free of the
charges of the ultimate beneficiaries. Until he decides whether to
probate his spouse's will and accept the benefits thereunder, he is
free to deal as he chooses with all of his own property and all
property held jointly. Once he accepts the benefits, however, he is
bound under the terms of the agreement. At this moment, he sub-
jects his dealings with the property to judicial scrutiny in terms of
his good faith, 75 necessity for maintenance, 76 reasonableness of
gifts, 77 and the like. Recognizing the creation of a contract at this,
moment, as is apparent, maximizes the flexibility with which the
survivor may deal with his property.
Along a similar vein, in Wisconsin, recognition of the existence
of a contract at the moment a survivor accepts material benefits
under a contractual will operates to hold in abeyance the rights of
third-party beneficiaries. It has been suggested in Estate of
Cochrane7 8 that the Tweedale third-party beneficiary rule operates
to protect the rights of third parties established by the "original
agreement."1 79 Upon the establishment of such an agreement, ac-
cording to the court, the contracting parties lose the ability to alter
the contract, at least insofar as the third-party's rights are affected.
In Wisconsin it thus appears that judicial recognition of the exist-
ence of a contract only at the moment the survivor accepts benefits
conferred pursuant to the contractual will offers the greatest
amount of time, from the viewpoint of the survivor, to deal with
his property unencumbered by the claims of third parties."'
The chief disadvantage of recognizing rights and obligations as
created only at the moment a survivor to a contractual will accepts
actual benefits under the other's will involves the conceivable frus-
tration of the contract's purpose. The general intent of a contrac-
tual will is to assure a mutually agreeable dispositive scheme.' 8'
175. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. First Presbyterian Church, 134 Kan. 643, 648-49, 7 P.2d 81,
84 (1932).
176. Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915).
177. Estate of Lenders, 247 Iowa 1205, 78 N.W.2d 536 (1956).
178. 13 Wis. 2d 398, 108 N.W.2d 529 (1968).
179. Id. at 402, 108 N.W.2d at 532.
180. See also Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 347, 145 N.W.2d 754,759 (1966).
181. Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60,73-74,35 S.E. 415,418-19 (1899).
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Both parties expressly or tacitly agree that each shall execute a will
under which certain agreed-upon beneficiaries are to receive speci-
fied property. In reliance upon such an agreement, the parties exe-
cute either a joint will or mutual wills. With such an agreed-upon
will in effect, one of the parties usually predeceases the other.
Should the agreement be judicially recognized only when the survi-
vor probates the decedent's will and accepts actual benefits thereun-
der, it is readily apparent that he is in a position to deal with his
individually owned property and all jointly owned property in a
manner not contemplated in his agreement with the decedent.
This proposition has been suggested in Sherman v. Goodson's
Heirs. 82 The permissive negative inference of recognizing the
"acceptance-of-the-benefits" rule, according to this Texas deci-
sion, is that if there is no acceptance of actual benefits there is no
enforceable contract. The court stated: "It may even be conceded
that after the death of one it might have been revoked by the
survivor before she accepted the benefits which the will con-
ferred." 1 83 As has been indicated above,'84 what this simply means
is that until the time of acceptance of the benefits, only an offer of
contract exists. That offer is accepted at the moment the survivor
chooses to probate the decedent's will. Until that moment, as
Sherman suggests, the survivor is free to deal with as he chooses
all jointly or solely owned property. This, of course, is true irrespec-
tive of the probable intent of the deceased.
This problem has also received attention in Wisconsin. Under
the Hoeppner logic, 85 by which the court expanded the concept of
a "benefit" to include the mere death of the other except where oral
contracts to devise are involved, it appears that the frustration of
contract above mentioned is yet possible. In the oral contract situa-
tion, as noted, yet required to evidence the agreement is an actual
acceptance of material benefits pursuant to the Doyle-Schwartz
rationale. This being the case, the survivor of an oral contract
connected with a joint or mutual will is able to postpone "accept-
ance" of the offer and the resulting contract rights and obligations.
This frustration is apparently also possible under the reasoning
of the recent Estate of Chayka decision. 8 Though noting that
182. 219 S.W. 839 (rex. Civ. App. 1920).
183. Id. at 841.
184. See note 146 and accompanying text supra.
185. Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 345-46, 145 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1966).
186. 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).
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general good-faith considerations prevail over contract sophistica-
tions, the court did confine itself to "property received under the
joint will."187 By deliberately denuding herself of the assets received
pursuant to the contractual joint will, Evelyn Flanagan Chayka
complied with the agreement only in form and not in substance.
This being precisely what the agreement of the parties sought to
prevent, the transfers were voided.
The obvious negative inference of the "received under" state-
ment is that property not passing under the other's will is not
subject to the contract's purview. Thus, for example, property pass-
ing via the survivorship of joint tenancy and property solely owned
by the survivor can be dealt with as the survivor chooses. This can
hardly be said to be in the contemplation of the parties who inten-
tionally include such property within a common dispositive
scheme. Unless Chayka's "convenant of good faith that accompa-
nies every contract"'88 can be extended to cover a situation where
no property is "received under" the other's will, a frustration of
the contract's purpose could result. The interesting factor concern-
ing Chayka is that it made no distinction between written and oral
contracts to devise, as propounded in previous Wisconsin cases. 89
Though involving an oral contract which was "conclusively
infer [red],"'' the Chayka opinion looks to apply to all of the var-
iants of a contractual will."' At best, a number of questions remain
unanswered with respect to precisely which property is subject to
the provisions of the contract, and which is not.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite countless pages written, both law and commentary,
concerning contractual joint or mutual wills, it should be readily
apparent that the area yet teems with uncertainty. Undertaken
187. Id. at 106, 176 N.W.2d at 563.
188. Id. at 107, 176 N.W.2d at 564.
189. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
190. 47 Wis. 2d at 106, 176 N.W.2d at 563.
191. Id.: "The parties may express such contract in a separate document, state in the
joint will that it is a contract, or the fact of contract may be conclusively presumed from
the fact of the joint will being executed." It should be noted that this portion of Chayka is
in part superseded by Wis. STAT. § 853.13(l), effective April 1, 1971, which includes in its
provisions:
(1) a contract not to revoke a will can be established only by: (a) provisions of the
will itself sufficiently stating the contract; (b) an express reference in the will to such
a contract and evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (c) if the will makes no
reference to a contract, clear and convincing evidence apart from the will.
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herein has been an extensive analysis of one aspect of this unique
relationship-the judicially recognized moment at which contract
rights and obligations are created and the effect of that recognition
upon the wisdom of employing the contractual will as an estate
planner's tool.
Without prevailing unduly upon the reader's own conclusions,
and assuming the disregard of Professor Page's insight, 192 some
observations can be made. Foremost is the utter necessity for recog-
nizing the distinct concepts of contract and will and the impact of
that distinction when the two are conjoined. Also critical to the
effective use of the contractual will is the knowledge, absent "draft-
ing out," of the judicially recognized moment at which the rights
and obligations incident to the contract spring into existence.
From the foregoing analysis, it should be apparent that the use
of the contractual will is least desirable where the contract exists
and binds the parties during their lives. Notwithstanding the cer-
tainty afforded, the testamentary rigidity resulting from an inter
vivos bilateral contract virtually negatives the value of a will. The
two operate at counter purposes, at least with respect to facile
testamentary change, when the contractual rights and obligations
exist during the lives of the parties. This is especially true in Wis-
consin, absent express reservation of the power to rescind or
modify.
In a judicial or statutory climate which recognizes the death of
one of the parties as the instant a contract becomes effective, the
contractual will may offer potential to an estate planner. If a single
word serves to describe the chief prerequisite of an efficient use of
the contractual will, it is specification. Throughout the reported
cases, it is precisely this lack of adequate contract terms which
leads contractual wills into litigation. Primary on the specification
checklist is an identification of those assets intended to be included
within the terms of the contract. Merely to dismiss this considera-
tion with a casual "all-of-our-property" clause is not sufficient.
Such a clause does not indicate the intended moment at which "all
our property" is to be computed. Thus, for example, a valid ques-
tion arises as to whether the parties intended only that property
owned at the death of the first or that held at the death of the
survivor. This determination is critical to the validity of gifts, even
reasonable ones, which the survivor may desire to bestow during
192. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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the balance of his life. Also specified ought be any limitations upon
the survivor's dealings with the property. Thus, any objections to
the conversion of real property into personalty, the use of such
property as collateral, or the investment of the property in business
ventures must be elaborated upon. A close scrutiny of the advisabil-
ity of using the contractual will in estates large enough to qualify
for the marital tax deduction should also be undertaken. As men-
tioned, at least three contractual will cases have been adjudged as
passing an insufficient interest to the survivor to qualify for the
marital deducation.
In jurisdictions favoring the moment of death plus the accep-
tance of benefits conferred pursuant to a contractual will as the
moment contract rights and obligations arise, specification is yet
the key. With the considerations already enumerated, the cautious
estate planner might recall the conceivable partial frustration of the
contract's purpose. If the survivor may deal as he chooses with his
solely owned property and all jointly owned property, at least until
he accepts the benefits conferred under the will of the decedent,
there appears to be little certainty, and hence value, in the use of
the contractual will. This possible frustration of purpose, at least
where the contract is obliquely written and partial performance is
relied upon as its proof, exists in Wisconsin. Elaboration would
serve to eliminate the problem.
Regardless of the choice a particular jurisdiction has adopted
with regard to the moment contract rights and obligations blossom,
the attorney drafting the contractual will is usually able to specify,
as a term of the contract, when the agreement shall bind the parties.
Invariably, statutes and case law define this moment only absent
indication in the document itself. The estate planner is, therefore,
easily able to foreclose difficulty with this, the chief of all problems
incident to use of the contractual will.
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